1. Introduction
The Greater Bristol Strategic Transport Study (GBSTS) was published in June 2006, and contained a number of conclusions regarding the future of transport in the Greater Bristol area.
The conclusions that related to the use of alternate modes of transport, and to improved public transport, are in the main supported by Wrington Parish Council. However, it does have serious concern over some aspects of the proposed highway schemes and has asked its Highways Working Group to look in detail at the measures proposed in the report.
This group of Councillors has been supplemented by volunteers with expertise in certain relevant areas and by consultants who have specific highways skills.
While undertaking this study, there has also been some public consultation in the Parish on the local issues, particularly a well-supported public meeting organised in February of this year.
The comments contained in this report are formally endorsed by Wrington Parish Council, and are submitted as a contribution to the further discussions, which are taking place on an amended strategy. The changes that have taken place in the last two years, and especially the proposed massive urban extensions to the southwest of Bristol and in the Weston area, have added a new dimension to the transport studies. The Highways Working Group has attempted to take into account these changes and presents its own conclusions as part of that debate. It is likely that the impact of the extension to the southwest of Bristol will be very significant on both public and private transport needs. Linkage to the motorway network for businesses in that area and travel to work needs for individuals will both be critical. On the other hand, without diminishing the major work needed on infrastructure related to the proposed Weston expansion, it is planned that this will be employment led with housing and employment being increased in a balanced way. This should limit the external impacts and make the transport solutions much more self-contained.
It might be argued that the world has changed since the original GBSTS report, and that some of the conclusions on extensive road building have been overtaken by changing economic circumstances, more focus on sustainable development and transport policies, and increasing efforts to offset climate change. However, Wrington Parish Council believes that it is still important to make its` views known on a significant report – a report which contrary to statements made in the text has not
entirely “been progressed in an open and consultative manner and the possible options discussed publicly”. The Council not been consulted on one of the main conclusions that would have serious implications for this Parish, and now wishes to make its` views known through this considered response.
2. Highways proposals examined by the Working Group
The main highways proposals contained in the GBSTS report that have been examined by the group include:-
a. The link road from Junction 21 to the A 38 near BIA
b. The link from Junction 20 to the end of the Long Ashton Bypass
c. The Orange route as a Barrow Gurney bypass, linking the A 38 to the end of the Long Ashton
Bypass.
d. The red route linking the A 38 to the Bristol end of the Long Ashton Bypass, and forming part of the
south Bristol Ring road
e. Improvements to the A 38 to the north of BIA, or improved public transport access
f. Improvements to motorway access from Weston at Junction 21.
g. Improvements to the rail service between Weston and Bristol
Several of these interact with one another, and in the GBSTS report the financial assessments on the various options include costs and benefits from more than one proposal. The group has spent time in discussion with Atkins in trying to understand the financial modelling involved, but still has some open questions on the costs used, the assumptions, and the logic contained in the report.
The group is in general terms quite supportive of measures c, d, e, and g, above, especially with the need to regenerate south Bristol, and with the possibility of the new urban extension to the south west of the current Bristol boundary. Improvements in access to the motorway network from Weston at J 21 (item f) are also needed, and supported.
The Orange route around Barrow Gurney is long overdue. The Red route from the A 38 to the Bristol end of the Long Ashton Bypass is an essential part of the south Bristol ring road. The upgrading of the A 38 to the north of BIA might become more critical as the passenger traffic grows to over 10 million passengers per year, unless significantly improved public transport access is provided. It is also seen as important that the rail service between Weston and Bristol, as outlined in the GBSTS report, is upgraded in order to reduce reliance on road traffic.
We note that the costs for upgrading the A 38 north of BIA are based upon lane widening, whereas the Arup Transport Assessment produced in support of the BIA Master Plan indicates that more extensive work might be required. This would inevitably increase the cost. Nonetheless, the conclusions on measures c, d, e, f, and g, are not in real doubt, apart from the difficulty in securing funds from central government.
It is therefore on the two links from the M 5 that we have concentrated our efforts, and these are attached from the GBSTS report as Appendix A.
The next section deals with each in detail.
3. The link from Junction 21 to the A 38 near BIA
Despite having supplementary advice from Atkins, the group still has difficulty in reconciling the costs used in the financial evaluations. These are set out in Table 6.20 of the GBSTS report, and this is attached as Appendix B.
Atkins have advised that the new link road from J 21, at 2005 quarter one prices, would cost £3.36 million per kilometre. To this would be added 14% for preparation and supervision, and 45% for the optimism bias – the uplift added by the consultants to reflect overrun experience. Based on a distance of 13.5 km, this would lead to a construction cost of £74.9 million without optimism bias. This is very close to the number shown in appendix 9.2, attached as Appendix C, which is assumed to be based on 2005 Q1 prices and including optimism bias.
However, table 6.20 that was used for the financial evaluation of the two link roads shows a different cost. On 2005 Q1 prices, it shows a figure of £88.8 million without optimism bias, and £128.7 million with optimism bias. We are advised by Atkins that several other costs have been added to those for the J 21 link, namely the Orange route cost and the upgrading of the A 38 to the north of BIA. Taking the values assigned to these on Fig 9.2, there is £13.4 million to be added for the Orange route, £27.5 million for the upgrading of the A 38, and £45.9 million for the widening of the Long Ashton Bypass. This would give a total cost on top of the £75 million BIA Link road of £161.8 million, but the figure used in the financial evaluation is £128.7 million.
Apart from having concerns that the incorrect figure might have been used, the group has a fundamental disagreement with the logic of including other costs, and benefits, in what ought to be a stand-alone evaluation of the £75 million cost of the J 21/BIA link with its separate justification, especially when the figures are used in a comparative assessment.
Furthermore, the group believes that the actual costs of the J 21/BIA link road have been understated. The report admits that the road line was only indicative, although comments in GBSTS suggest otherwise, and that no topographical studies had been undertaken. A brief examination of the route selected for costing would have shown that in passing to the north of Wrington, the road would have to rise 100 metres in less than 2 km. There would have to be substantial cutting and filling to cope with this rise and the sloping contours of the land. Quite apart from leaving a massive scar on the rural landscape, the costs would be significantly higher than those included in the GBSTS report.
A detailed look at the proposed route would also show that there is a cost to be added relating to the purchase of a number of properties on the west and north of Wrington and on the way to the A 38 near BIA. Nothing has been allowed for this cost in the evaluation.
The group would add to these financial questions a long list of environmental impacts that are set out below in section 5.
A more level route would be to the south of Wrington, but this would also have major environmental effects and be equally unjustified on a cost and benefit analysis. Predicted traffic flows just do not support this level of expenditure. A more southern route would still require a road construction of approximately 10.3 km, plus some upgrading of approximately 5.6 km on the A 38 to BIA.
It may still be worth considering an alternate design for a much shorter road closer to the M 5 at Junction 21, and to examine whether the Banwell bypass could be provided as part of that option. This was considered by the GBSTS study and not seen as having any strategic importance, although this would be dependent on the proposed interconnecting road links. No details were provided. The separate cost assigned to the bypass is quoted as a Present Value Cost of £42 million, although the report is unclear as to the basis of the estimate. If local congestion in Banwell were to justify a bypass, then the GBSTS suggestion of a second route along the valley from J 21 to BIA would seem quite illogical and a waste of public money.
However, the Highways Working Group eventually reached the conclusion that no new road building is actually required to link J 21 and the A 38. Local improvements may be needed to ease the congestion issues in the Banwell area, but no significant new building can be justified based on the traffic flows and the economic analyses. The group has examined the traffic flow information contained in the Transport Assessment prepared by Arup in November 2006 to accompany the BIA Master Plan. This shows clearly that most of the projected problems are to the north of BIA. The assessment confirms that 79% of all trips to the airport originate from the north. To the south of BIA it indicates possible problems to be overcome in the region of Churchill traffic lights when capacity exceeds 9 million passengers pa.
This in no way supports the argument for a new link road at a cost of £75 million. Air passenger origin and destination statistics, bus service user numbers, and the results of a survey by BIA amongst their employees, indicate no justification for an improved bus service from Weston to the airport. If a more regular bus service is not viable, major new road construction certainly is not.
Furthermore, it is the view of the Highways Working Group that passenger estimates currently being reviewed by BIA may well be over-optimistic. The tighter economic climate, the huge increase in the cost of fuel, and the very heavy reliance at BIA on the low-cost flying model, make the future growth in passenger levels much more difficult to predict.
4. The link from Junction 20 to the end of the Long Ashton Bypass
The group has studied the GBSTS report as far as it covers this option and the comparison it makes with the Junction 21 values.
Once again, the numbers quoted in the text are difficult to follow. The length of the link from J 20, according to Atkins, is 13.9 km. At a cost of £3.36 million per km this gives a 2005 Q1 capital cost of £77.2 million with optimism bias. The group has been advised that there may be some additional cost for a railway bridge, but is not aware how much this would add. The cost quoted in Table 6.20 for 2005 Q1 prices and with optimism bias is £98.4 million, and this has been used in the economic performance calculations. This is significantly higher than the recent advice from Atkins would indicate and this would clearly influence the economic conclusion. There is also a serious question over the estimated length of the link road used by Atkins. Even with a large southbound feeder design at J 20, it is difficult to see how the length could reach over 11 km. If the basis road length is wrong, then the conclusions on economic benefit and journey times compared with the J 21 link will inevitably lead to the wrong answer.
In the same table, 6.20, there has been no explanation as to the reason for the 2005 Q1 cost being put some £10 million below the 2002 PVC. Once again, if the base information is wrong, the conclusions are extremely suspect.
Looking at the topography that the J 20 link would follow, it is clear that, apart from the need to cross the railway, the route is almost flat and has very little in the way of buildings to deal with. Unlike the J 21 route, it should be a very straightforward construction and with some prospect of reducing the complexity and cost of the large exit link suggested at the J 20/M 5 interchange.
Unlike the J 21 link assessment, the economic evaluation does not include any of the other costs associated with the Orange route, the Long Ashton Bypass widening, or the upgrade for the A 38 north of BIA. The report has clearly not compared like with like, when it really needs a standalone look at both the J21 and J20 options on the same basis.
On another point, the group was concerned to verify the quoted saving in time assigned to the journey from Weston to Bristol using the J 21 and J 20 options. A small saving of 2 minutes in the journey time between Weston and Bristol is quoted in the report as a result of the J 20 route, see Table 6.19. Our own calculations of the J 21 option suggest that, to the common point on the A 370 used in the calculations, the journey time via Redhill and BIA will be longer. The distance is longer, the terrain involves more hills, and via J 20 there is the benefit of the motorway. This table indicates an 8 minute saving in time for the journey from BIA to Bristol city centre with a link to J 21. This is precisely the same as the saving in the whole journey from J 21 to the city centre via BIA, indicating no incremental benefit from the new road.
The Highways Working Group conclusion is that when detailed comparisons are made between the two link options, and when topography and other factors are fully taken into account, the J 20 route is the one that will prove to be more cost effective and environmentally acceptable on a like-for-like basis.
The proposed addition of 10.000 homes to the southwest of Bristol will put more pressure on a fast link to the M5. Given the location of the new houses, the short link to the M 5 down the Long Ashton bypass to a J 20 link road looks a better solution.
However, the economic justification for any new construction to J 20 is in itself unproven. It would have the disadvantage of encouraging more local traffic, particularly from Weston, to use the motorway for journeys to Bristol – and this on an already crowded section. In addition, there may well be a simpler, cheaper, link from south Bristol to the M 5 that would better serve the interests of south Bristol regeneration, and the expanded southwest of the city, to access the motorway network. This was not covered by the GBSTS report, but it is the view of the Highways Working Group that serious consideration ought to be given to a fast road link via the Portway to the M 5 at Avonmouth as an alternate to either of the southern links to J 20 or J 21. It would provide the shortest route from south Bristol to the motorway network, to other population centres, and to the principal markets of south Wales, the Midlands/North, and London and the M 4 corridor. It would also give far better, and quicker, access to and from BIA for air passengers originating from South Wales, the Midlands, the M4 corridor, and north/western parts of Bristol. And this is where the bulk of BIA passengers emanate.
If the Bristol ring road is not extended to access the M 4 at a new junction between Bristol and Bath, there is an even stronger argument for an upgraded Portway link, and even less case for a southern link to J 20 or J 21, since there will be no complete eastern/southern Bristol fast ring from the M4 to M5.
5. Environmental issues
All new road construction has environmental impacts on the built and natural environments as well as on people. The following comments illustrate these qualitative impacts by referring to some of the issues raised by the BIA Link road proposal.
The Parish of Wrington has many attractive environmental features. Its landscape, its rural aspect, the wooded hills fringing the north of the villages of Wrington and Redhill, and not to mention the highly regarded Conservation Area, make it an attractive location to live in, to work in, and to visit. The proposed road to the north of the villages would have such an impact that it would destroy much that is valued in the area.
The road would undoubtedly have very serious implications for the whole of the Wrington Vale and these are set out below:-
a. The contours that would have to be overcome when constructing the road up steep and sloping terrain from Wrington to the A 38 would cause a massive scar on the rural landscape. This would be visible over a wide area both from the Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty on the Mendips, and from many areas to the south and west. It would be an unbelievable act of vandalism to the countryside. This view is supported by NSC`s Core Strategy Vision which emphasises the need for “open countryside to be protected from intrusive development”.
b. The quality, character and local distinctiveness of this natural environment is reflected in RSS Policy ENV 1, “Protecting and Enhancing the Region`s Natural Environment”. It is particularly relevant that this policy states “ Any development that could have a negative effect on the integrity and conservation objectives of an N2K site would not be in accordance with the development plan”.
c. The proposed road alignment would cut through or directly impact various designated areas and structures both within and to the north of Wrington. These include the Conservation Area, Listed buildings, Scheduled ancient monuments, a Historic garden, Regionally Important Geological/Geomorphological Sites, and Wildlife sites.
d. The proposed road would cut through ancient woodlands to the north of Wrington. These are designated as “ancient semi-natural woodland” and contain many plants that are either Ancient Woodland Indicator Species for the South West or are North Somerset key species. A sample of these is as follows: Acer campestre (field maple), Anemone nemorosa (wood anemone), Dactylorhiza fuchsia (common spotted orchid), Hyacinthoides non scripta (bluebells), Hypericum androssaemum (tutsan), Melica uniflora (wood melick), Primula vulgaris (primrose), Prunus avium (wild cherry), Rosa arvensis (field rose), Tamus communis (black bryony), Tilla cordata (small leaf lime), and Vicia sepium (bush vetch). Appendix D gives a snapshot of flora found in just one short hedgerow to the north of Branches Cross at map reference ST474632. It illustrates the richness and diversity in this area. These woodlands are precious and deserve preservation not desecration.
e. The road would represent a serious risk to the foraging area and foraging routes of the Greater Horseshoe bats. This species is among the most protected in Europe, and there is a significant colony in the woodlands directly above the proposed route. There is one maternity roost, with other local roosts known, and these animals are priority action species in both the Avon and North Somerset Biodiversity Action Plans. In addition, Barley Farm – directly on the indicative route – is home to a lesser horseshoe bat maternity roost. This is considered to be of national significance. Furthermore, the following bats have been recorded within the vicinity of Wrington: the common pipistrelle, soprano pipistrelle, daubenton`s, noctule, long eared, natterer`s, and whiskered.
f. In addition to bats, another Biodiversity Action Plan species regularly reported along the proposed route is the otter. Otter spraints can be found along the relatively quiet stretch of the Yeo between Congresbury and Wrington. Other rare “at risk” fauna include dormice, birds of prey, several owl species, the brown hare, harvest mice, slow-worms, and hedgehogs.
g. The route proposed by GBSTS crosses the Levels and Moors Landscape Character land to the west of Congresbury and Wrington, skirts the SSSI between Nye and Puxton, crosses the Local Nature Reserve created along the former Strawberry line and would need to bridge the River Yeo, a designated wildlife site. Significantly, GBSTS acknowledges that much of the land, including that closer to Wrington, is flood plain. The fields immediately to the west of Wrington flood regularly and provide some flood relief for the village.
h. Closer to Redhill and the airport there are major concerns that the road could interfere with groundwater source protection zones. The Chelvey Groundwater Source Protection Zone extends over much of the land to the north of Wrington, and construction of a road in association with any growth-related development on the south side of the airfield could have significant water supply implications.
i. There is a high risk that road construction would increase the regular flooding problems being encountered in Wrington by accelerating the run-off of surface water. Two serious floods occurred in July 2007 and January 2008, with several other events in the past ten years and a major incident in 1968. NSC recently engaged expert consultants in an attempt to find solutions to the problem, although the scope of the problem has since caused these consultants to be replaced. Also the particular geology to the north of the village is such that road construction ground-works could impact drainage characteristics and lead to the creation of further springs in the valley.
j. There would be an unacceptable increase in noise pollution and other social impacts such as vibration and visual distraction arising from this, and other, new road construction. Mitigation of these would only serve to increase costs still further.
Even the GBSTS report acknowledges that the routes from Junction 21 would have “significant environmental impacts”, and it would not take much of an environmental assessment to show that the route to the north of Wrington would be quite disastrous in this regard. The report also recognises that the scheme is likely to meet with “considerable levels of debate” and that “the exact alignment of the route will need to be subject to further analysis and appraisal.”
The Highways Working Group would wholeheartedly agree with that conclusion.
6. Conclusion
The original brief given to the GBSTS team and its consultants did not include any mention of a new road from Junction 21 to the A 38 south of BIA. It was only late in the process that this option was included – at the request, it is understood, of one of the member parties. Clearly Atkins were not in a position within the available timeframe to carry out a proper evaluation, and may not even have visited the proposed route. They undertook a desktop assessment and reached some very preliminary conclusions.
In this note, the Wrington Highways Working Group has tried to flesh out some of the obvious arguments and to make a detailed contribution to the further work that is now being considered at the sub-regional level. There do appear to be some illogical conclusions and unsound comparisons being made in the original report, and it is hoped that any later studies will recognise this. The Wrington group is convinced that the correct economic and environmental conclusions point heavily against a new road from Junction 21 along Wrington Vale, and absolutely against the actual route proposed to the north of the village.
At the same time it has to be recognised that all of the conclusions are based on data that is now almost four years old. Costs that are based on 2005 Q1 would, even by Q2 2007 (the latest available date for firm construction cost data) have to be inflated by 21.7%. This would have increased the cost of the J 21 to A 38 road from the original £75 million to over £91 million, and we are now 18 months on from that date. If the cost quoted in Table 6.20 is taken as the true base - £88.8 million – this would have inflated to £108 million by Q2 2007. This level of expenditure would be difficult to justify at any time, let alone when an economic recession is being faced.
The J 21 link road, as well as the J 20 option, should be dropped, and the sub-region should concentrate its available resources on the much needed and well documented improvements to public transport and the other measures contained within the GBSTS report, plus limited highways schemes to resolve congestion issues at bottlenecks and to meet proven needs.
In the view of the Working Group, the following measures that have an impact on North Somerset should be those to adopt or examine further:-
a. The construction of the Red route, linking the A 38 to the A 370.
b. The provision of an expanded Park and Ride site adjacent to the Long Ashton bypass, with a much-improved public rapid-transport link to central Bristol.
c. The upgrading of the A 38 north of BIA, unless public transport to the airport can be improved. eg: by the extension of the rapid-transport link from the Ashton Vale Park and Ride site to BIA. The latter is the preferred option.
d. The construction of the Barrow Gurney bypass, or Orange route.
e. The construction of the Banwell bypass, or other measures to improve the current serious congestion there.
f. Upgrading of the link to the M5 from south Bristol via the Portway.
g. Improvements to Junction 21 to ease traffic congestion and improve access to the M5 from Weston.
h. Working with residents to encourage more efficient transport use, increased car sharing, and non-car modes of transport.
i. Promotion of bus services and bus use, alongside improvements to the bus network across North Somerset, including the Weston to BIA and Bristol bus routes.
j. Improved rail links between Weston/Worle and the main Bristol stations.
Wrington Parish Council, Highways Working Group.
November 2008
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